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THE RELATION BETWEEN GROWTH OPPORTUNITY,
LEVERAGE POLICY AND FUNCTION OF COVENANT
TO CONTROL THE AGENCY CONFLICT BETWEEN
SHAREHOLDERS AND DEBTHOLDERS
Rhini Fatmasari 1
Agency conflict is a phenomenon that relates to the firm»s financing policies, especially of those
related to the leverage strategies. Some of the former researches revealed the existence of a negative
effect between growth opportunity, and either leverage, and debt maturity as one of the efforts in
controlling the agency conflict between stockholders and bondholders. By using panel data regression
model, this study found that firms with high growth opportunity tend to use low leverage policies with
short maturity to control the agency conflict between stockholders and bondholders. On the other hand,
firms with low growth opportunity tend to use higher leverage policies with a longer period of debt
maturity. Moreover, covenant as a moderating variable, could lower the negative relation between growth
opportunity and leverage, but it could not diminish the negative relation between growth opportunity
and debt maturity. Debt maturity and covenant also could not be use as substitution variable to lessen the
agency conflict.
1 The author is a lecturer of study of Economy at PIPS FKIP Universitas Terbuka; rheins2009@gmail.com
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I. INTRODUCTION
Modern corporation will still exist and dominate economic life if it has two combinations:
assets in place (tangible assets) and investment opportunities (intangible assets). Both
combinations can affect the capital structure and the corporate value. In addition, these
instruments will also create and exploit the investment opportunities (Arifin: 209). If this
investment opportunity is not executed, then the economic activities will be limited to sale and
purchase of materials, capital and labor, and already these activities are saturated, highly
competitive, and produce only a minimal profit. The current main driver of modern economy is
the exploitation of new technologies and the transfer process toward a more capital intensive
production. The utilization and execution of investment opportunities can only be done if the
company has the adequate financial, technical and human resources.
Concerning the funding issues, companies can obtain them from two sources, first from
the company itself, such as the issuance of stock and retained earnings; second from external
resources of the company in the form of a debt to a third party, which depends on the funding
policy of the company. Regardless the size of the company, usually the company choose to use
the fund from outside the company in the form of debt. However, this policy is not without
risk. There are certain conditions that can arise from these policies which is the emergence of
the so-called agency conflict. In the perspective of agency theory, the conflict between the
agent and the principal is caused by an asymmetry of information. Agents who possess
information often take more opportunistic actions that benefit themselves. On the other hand,
principal with relatively less information demand a higher contribution. The main conflict occurs
when the principal received the cash payment in smaller amount. According to Jensen (1986),
agency conflict arises when these 2 interests meet in a joint activity, and since this conflict
creates a problem (agency cost), then each party will try to reduce it.
In the case of the policy on determining the leverage of the company, the problem that
arises is the conflict between shareholders and bondholders. This conflict occurs because of
the revenue structure (pay off) and different levels of risk. The revenue structure (pay off) of
bondholders earns a fixed income from interest and repayment of the loan, while the shareholders
get any excess revenue after the liability that needs to be paid to bondholders. Based on the
level of risk, when shareholders through the management exercise a high-risk activity, the level
of risk faced by bondholders is much higher than the shareholders (Hanafi, 2005). The level of
agency conflict is influenced by the growth opportunities level. Companies with high growth
opportunities tend to have higher conflict. This conflict arise when a company deals with
investment opportunities on projects with positive NPV that require the use of substantial funds.
Under the conditions of low free cash flow and small assets in place, to achieve the funds
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needed to continue the existing projects, the companies tend to take loans. This is the possibility
that incite the conflict between shareholders and bondholders.
The agency conflict between bondholders and shareholders can be prevented. There are
three mechanisms that offered: the reduction of total debt, short-maturity and covenant.
Covenant in Indonesia is known as the trusteeship agreement that must be made by the company
at the time of the registration of that company in Indonesia Stock Exchange. The agreement is
made between the issuers (companies that issue the bonds) and Trustee (Act No. 8 Th. 1995 on
the Capital Market.) The trustees act as a party representing the interests of bondholders as
well as providing protection to them.
The description above shows that the agency conflict is a phenomenon that cannot be
avoided when a corporation creates debt. The phenomenon that occurred in Indonesia, based
on a number of studies, carried out by Nurdin (2001) among others; indicate that the rate of
growth companies in the past has a positive and significant relationship with the level of leverage
in the present. That means the companies with high growth rates in the past will have a high
degree of leverage in the present. In another study, Widyastuti (2007) stated that there are
conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders, and between shareholders or managers
with creditors in Indonesian companies.
The studies in Indonesia regarding the agency conflict have only revealed the presence or
the absence of agency conflicts and the relationship between the investments opportunities
and leverage policies that lead agency conflict, but yet none reveal the agency conflict itself.
Our current study refers to the study of Nurdin (2001) and Widyastuti (2007) concerning the
existence of agency conflict in Indonesia by looking at the growth opportunity variable as one
of the variables that influence the conflict, and at the policy leverage as the dependent variable.
However, both studies have not seen how to control the agency conflict. This research will
enter this area with the variables of growth opportunity, leverage, debt maturity and covenants.
Covenant will be used as a moderating variable that affect the relationship between growth
opportunities and leverage, and also as moderating variables that influence the relationship
between growth opportunities and debt maturity. We also predict the covenant to be an
alternative to control the conflict between shareholders and bondholders. Variables that will be
developed in this study had previously been used by Blillet et al. (2007) on the case of US. We
use growth opportunity to proxy the agency conflict in Indonesia, and we expect it yield new
variants among the existing agency conflict studies in Indonesia.
Specifically, this study raises the issue of whether the growth opportunity affects the
change of leverage and the debt maturity choice, and whether the effect of growth opportunity
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toward the change of leverage and debt maturity choices would be different if there are
covenants as a mechanism to guarantee debts? Explicitly, this study aims to examine the role of
covenant to the changes in leverage and debt maturity policies under the condition of different
growth level of companies to control the conflict between stockholders and bondholders.
The rest of this paper describes the theory and the third section elaborates the data and
methodology used. The results of the estimation model and the analysis are presented in the
fourth section, while conclusions and suggestions are given in the last section.
II. THEORY
The decision of the funding is based on the selection of funding sources, both internal
and external. The choice of the company is influenced by many things, one of which is the
investment opportunity. Jensen (1986) states that a company with high investment opportunity
usually has a high growth rates, is active in investing, has a low free cash flow and small assets
in place. In these conditions, the company tends to use external funds in the form of debt.
On the other hand, the debt policy as a source of corporate funding potentially leads
agency conflict between shareholders and bondholders that also will also cause agency costs
(Jensen and Mecling, 1976). This condition shows the use of debt, in companies that have a
high investment opportunity, will become expensive and cause a high cost of debt. As a result
the company will leave a positive NPV projects and lose the opportunities to grow. To avoid the
problems on the cost of debt, these companies with high investment opportunity then will
choose to use the loan in small amounts, or to use internal funds as an alternative funding.
Finally, the relationship between the leverage and investment opportunity will negative.
The above conclusion is also supported by a study of Rajan and Zingales (1995), Johnson
(2003) and Billett et al. (2007) Fitriyanti and Hartono (2002) Subekti and Kusuma (2001) which
stated that there was a negative relationship between leverage and growth opportunities.
Based on empirical evidence, the first hypothesis that will be proposed in this study is: growth
opportunity negatively affects leverage changes.
In order to reduce the agency conflicts, companies with high investment opportunity
tend to use the debt policy in a small amount and short maturity as one way to reduce investment
costs and to increase firm value. Empirical studies such as Johnson (2003), Billett et al., (2007),
Barclay and Smith (1995), implies the existence of a negative relationship between growth
opportunities and leverage policy. Companies with high growth opportunities tend to use the
policy of low leverage and short maturity to reduce the agency conflict and the cost of debt.
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Starting from the empirical evidence mentioned above, the next hypothesis posed is: growth
opportunity negatively affects the debt maturity
The negative relationship between growth opportunities and leverage can be lowered
down with the inclusion of covenants in the debt issuance as it can reduce the conflict between
stockholders and bondholders. Covenant can be used as a guarantee to bondholders that the
company will use the existing funds in investments that bring in positive NPV and assurance
that the company will prioritize the debt payments to bondholders before making other financial
policies in accordance with the agreements stated in the covenant. The use of covenants in
reducing the agency conflict between the company and the owners of capital, especially in
companies with high growth opportunities, is presented by Smith and Warner (1979). Thus the
second hypothesis is: the level of covenants affects the reduction of the negative impact between
the growth opportunities and leverage changes.
The selection of different maturity debt at different levels of opportunity growth will also
have an impact on the use of covenants. High debt with long maturity tends to use covenant as
collateral in the company»s debt, while low debt with short maturity does not need to require
the covenants in its debt agreements. So the next hypothesis proposed in this study is: the level
of covenants affects the reduction of the negative impact between the policy of growth
opportunities and the debt maturity.
III. METHODOLOGY
3.1. Data and Variable
This research was conducted on a publishing event of a covenant. The data required
were (1) leverage data of the company, (2) covenant information (agreement of trustee) of the
company, (3) debt maturity structure, and (4) growth opportunities and other corporate
characteristics data such as firm size, profitability, financially constrained, and fixed assets.
This study uses the company analysis data that issued the bonds accompanied with the
issuance of covenant (the trusteeship agreement) from 2003 until 2008. The sample selection
is based on purposive sampling with the goal of obtaining a representative sample in accordance
with the criteria: non-financial companies that issue bonds during the registration of the company
at the Indonesian Stock Exchange.
1. The first variable is the leverage, calculated by formula as follows.
        Leverage  = Total debt  / Total asset
where Total debt = long-term debt + debt in current liabilities.
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2. The second variable is the debt maturity proxied with the maturity of bonds issued by
companies listed in the trusteeship agreement and published on the site www.idx.co.id
3. The third variable is the covenant index that measures the covenants contained in the
trusteeship agreement. The indexing of covenant refers to the Billet, et al. (2007). But by
looking at samples of covenants that exist in Indonesia and their content, this study adjusts
some groups of covenants index under the agreement that is used so that the covenant
index would be arranged into 24 groups based on its category. The grouping of indicators
that compose the covenants can be seen in the following table.
Table 1
The Indicator of Covenant Index Composition
 No        Type of Covenant                                            Remarks
Dividend payment
restriction
Share repurchase
Restrictive
Funded Debt Restrictive
Subord Debt restrictive
Senior debt Restrictive
Secured Debt Restrictive
Total Leverage Test
Sale and Lease Back
Stock Issue Restrictive
Asset Sale Clause
Invest Policy Restrictive
Merger Restrictive
Assurance
Business Modification
Capitalization
Limiting the payment to equity holder and the others
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
An issue is defined dividend restriction if there is a covenant that restrict the
dividend payment of issuer or subsidiary issuer
An issue is defined repurchase restriction if there is a covenant that restricts the
liberty to do the payment to shareholders and the others.
Limiting issuer to issue new debts with 1 year of maturity or more
Limiting issuer to issue subordinate, senior and secured debt
Included to this category is the limit of accounting variation bases from leverage,
including the minimum requirement of net worth to the minimum requirement
of earning ratio
This covenant restrict the issuer and its subordinate companies to sell, assure
and lease the assets put as the guaranty to the debt holder without the consent
of the Trustee
Limit the issuer to issue common stock or preferred stock
If issue, or oblige the use of net proceeds from the sale of the majority of the
assets to re-obtain the issue at par or premium par
Restrict the issuer or the subordinate companies to invest or to introduce the
stock share to other party
Limit the issuer or the subordinate companies to do merger, consolidation or
accusation with other companies
Forbid issuers or the subordinate companies to give assurance to other party
on their liabilities
Restrict the issuers or subordinate companies to make major changes from
their main industry
Limit the companies to reduce their basic capital and capital paid by the
companies
Limitation to the financial activity
Investment Policy
Industrial Policy
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  No        Type of Covenant                                            Remarks
Leasing
Affiliation
Loan
Loan to association
company
Additional business
activity |
Bankruptcy
Structure of
shareholders
Business control by
other party
Share take-over
Industrial Policy
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
Restrict issuers and its subordinate companies to lease/assure their revenue
and issuers capital which is already leased
Limit the companies to do transaction with affiliated parties
Restrict issuers and its subordinate companies to give loans to other parties,
unless regulated within the trusteeship agreement
Give loan or credit to association company
To exercise other business activity not mentioned within AD
Demand to declare bankruptcy
Modify the structure of shareholders
Make a management agreement with other party which cause the business
unit to be controlled by other party
Take over the shares or assets of the parties
Then, the 24 covenant categories are used in the covenant index for each company every
year. This variable is given a value = 1 if the trusteeship agreement has at least one debt
instrument, and valued = 0, if no debt instrument used. Furthermore, the value is summed
and divided by 24 to make a covenant index ranges from 0 (for no covenant protection at
all) to 1 (for a complete covenant), (Billet et al., 2007).
4. To calculate the growth opportunities, the investment-based proxies with proxy of CAPXBVA
are used, which is the comparison between the capital expenditure and the total assets at
beginning of year t.
Capital Expenditure
Total asset
CAPXBVA  =
CAPXBVA ratio shows that there is a freedom of companies to make new investment
opportunities. The company will acquire a greater investment opportunities when investing
in their assets compared with the companies that only invest less (Adam and Goyal, 2008).
In this study, control variables are also used, intended to see whether the inclusion of
these variables in a model will significantly raise the main independent variable in a way to
minimize the error term. Referring to the Billet et.al (2007), there are 3 control variables that
can be used, as the following:
1. Fixed assets (Fix), is the ratio of the value of fixed assets listed on financial statements of
companies in the year to the book value of total assets,
314 Bulletin of Monetary, Economics and Banking, January 2011
2. Profitability (profit) is the ratio of EBITDA to book value of total assets,
EBITDA
Book Value of Total AssetProfitability  =
Table 2. Company Classification : financially constrained
and non financially constrained
Leverage
CF High Low
High Financial
Constrained
Low Non Financial
Constrained
Total Fixed Asset
Book Value of Total AssetFixed Asset  =
3. Firm Size (Size) is the natural logarithm (Ln) of net sales, in millions of dollars.
4. Financially Constrained
To determine a company to be categorized as financially constrained and non-financially
constrained, the method developed by Moyen (2004), Lang and Ofek (1996), Hovakimian and
Titman (2006) and Hidayat (2010) is used.
The classification in this research is done by using the matrix (Table 2). In the first
classification, the companies are categorized to be financially constrained and non-financially
based on the level of leverage and cash flow. Companies with less leverage than the average
debt ratio of the entire sample, categorized as non- financially constrained company, while
companies with debt ratios higher than the average debt ratio of the entire sample is then
categorized as financially constrained company. Companies that have cash flows greater than
the average cash flow of the entire sample is categorized as non-financially constrained, while
companies that have cash flow less than the average cash flow of the entire sample are
categorized as financially constrained.
Furthermore, companies with high cash flow and high leverage and also low cash flow
and low leverage are classified based on the payment of dividend. Companies that pay dividends
are categorized as non-financially constrained company, while those that do not pay dividends
are categorized as financially constrained company.
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3.2. Empirical Model
Data processing method which applies is a multiple regression on three models developed.
The first model, tests the effect of growth opportunities against the change of leverage from
the previous year and debt maturity.
Model 1a.  6Lev = α1 + β1 CAPXBVAt + β2 fixt+ β3profit-t + β4 Ln sizet +  β5 D+ error
Model 1b. Mat   = α2 + β6CAPXBVAt + β7fix t + β8profit-t + β9 Ln sizet +  β10D+error
The second model, tests the effect of covenants as a relationship moderating variable
between the growth opportunities and changes of leverage and the influence of covenant as a
relationship moderating variable between growth opportunities and debt maturity.
Model 2a.    6Lev = α3 + β11 CAPXBVAt + β12 (CAPXBVAt x indeks covenant)+ β13 indeks
   covenant + β14profit-t + β15Ln sizet +  β16D +error.
Model 2b.     Mat =  α4+ β17CAPXBVAt + β18 (CAPXBVAt x indeks covenant)+ β19fix t
    + β20indeks covenant + β21profit-t + β22  Ln Sizet + β23D +error.
IV. RESULT AND ANALYSIS
One of the control variables in this study is the Financially Constrained, which is translated
into the model in the form of a dummy variable (1 for the financially constrained company and
0 for non-financially constrained company). Companies are categorized as financially constrained
and non-financially constrained according to the level of leverage, cash flow and dividends.
Company classification results that are categorized as financially constrained and non-financially
constrained can be seen in table 4, where the number of non-financially constrained and
financially constrained companies respectively is 22 and 28.
Table 3.
Descriptive Statistic of Employed Variables
Variable Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Variance
Prbh_Leverage .462871 -.294715 .168156 .00678731 .099270977 .010
Profitability .56779 -.27553 .29226 .0795834 .09116627 .008
LN_size 7.84 10.11 17.95 14.2847 1.59090 2.531
Debt_mat   7 3 10 5.30 1.854 3.439
Fix_asset .980264 .019736 1.000000 .48414134 .265841728 .071
CAPXBVA .824561 -.085593 .738967 .13599926 .196181581 .038
Covenant_20 .40 .15 .55 .3920 .10220 .010
interaksi_20cov .36 -.03 .33 .0488 .07004 .005
Covenant_24 .38 .12 .50 .3442 .08698 .008
interaksi_24cov .30 -.02 .28 .0437 .06161 .004
Note: number of sample = 50 companies. The raw data and the formation of variable are available with the author and the redactor of BEMP
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In the explanation of hypothesis 1a, it is stated that companies with high growth
opportunity have smaller leverage changes compared with companies with low growth
opportunity. That indicates that leverage of a company with higher growth opportunity will be
lower at t0 compared with at t-1. On the contrary, companies with low growth opportunity
have a larger leverage change, which means that leverage on higher than t0 at t-1 leverage.
Statistical tests of hypothesis 1a can be seen in table 5.
Table 4. Classification of Financially Constrained and
Non-Financially Constrained Companies
Leverage
CF High Low
High 10 22 (FC)
Low 7 (NFC) 11
Pay  Dividend Pay No Dividend
( NFC )  (FC )
L (T) CF (T) 6 4
L (R) CF (R) 9 2
    Total 22 28
Table 5.
Result test of Hypothesis 1a
Independent  Variable Coefficient Value t
(Constant) -0.328      -2.852**
CAPXBVA -0.152  2.006*
Fix Asset 0.023        0.412
Profitability 0.196  1.404
Ln Size 0.023        2.943**
Constraint -0.005 -0.183
**   Significant at the level of 5%
*   Significant at the level of 10%
The test result shows that the β1 coefficient investment opportunities proxied with
negatively valued CAPXVBA and significant at ± 10%. This proves the hypothesis 1a; the growth
opportunity negatively affects the change of leverage changes. This implies a high growth
opportunity that will cause companies to reduce the amount of its leverage and use more the
internal funding sources as an alternative funding. Sources of funding will be utilized to execute
the existing investment opportunities. Meanwhile, within the companies with low growth
opportunity, the leverage policy would occur otherwise where the use of external funds would
 Category
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be greater. This policy is taken to control the agency conflict between shareholders and
bondholders.
Furthermore, the hypothesis testing 1b concerning the growth opportunity that negatively
affects the debt maturity, can be seen in table 6.
Table 6.
Test Result of Hypothesis 1b
Independent  Variable Coefficient Value t
(Constant) -1.759 -0.786
CAPXBVA -3.355   2.272**
Fix Asset 1.886     1.773*
Profitability -3.404  -1.253
Ln Size 0.472       3.078**
Constraint 0.226   0.444
The test result shows that the growth opportunity negatively affects the debt maturity, as
seen in CAPXVBA coefficient (which is a proxy for growth opportunity), being negative and
significant at the level of 10%. This shows that to reduce the conflict between shareholders
with bondholders within companies with a high growth opportunity, the short-maturity debt
policy is used. While companies with low growth opportunity, tend to make the policies of
leverage use with a longer maturity debt.
The third hypothesis tested (Hypothesis 2a) states that the level of covenants affects in
the reduction of the negative impacts between the growth opportunity and leverage changes.
That means that the interaction between the covenant indexes with CAPXBVA is a variable that
may moderate the negative effects between growth opportunity and leverage changes. The
test results of hypothesis 2a can be seen in table 7.
Table 7.
Test Result of Hypothesis 2a
20 covenant indicators 24 covenant indicators
(Constant) -0.037 2.369** -0.037 2.369**
CAPXBVA -0.221 3.370** -0.221 3.370**
(Constant) 0.391 3.461** -0.384 3.130**
Covindeks*CAPXBVA 0.306   1.694* 0.321   1.490
Covenant indeks 0.111  0.950 0.025   0.180
Profitability 0.181 1.366 0.202   1.498
Ln Size 0.023 2.934** 0.024      3.113**
Constraint -0.006 -0.241 -0.005  -0.186
Coefficient Value t Coefficient Value t
Independent
Variable
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From table 7 it shows that on 20 covenant indicators, the β15 CAPXBVA coefficient is
positive and significant at α level of 10%. While on the 24 covenants indicators, the β15
CAPXBVA coefficient is negative and not significant. Based on the above statistical tests, the
hypothesis is supported on the 20 indicators of covenant. It proves that there were 20 indicators
making up the covenants index contained in the Trusteeship Agreement which also functions
as a moderating variable to reduce the negative impact between growth opportunities and
leverage changes.
Furthermore, hypothesis 2b tests the effect of covenants in reducing the negative impact
between the growth opportunities with debt maturity. Statistically, this is the test to see whether
the covenant is a moderating variable. The statistical result to prove the hypothesis 2b can be
seen in table 8.
The test result as shown by table 8 implies that is negative and insignificant, both in the
test of 20 covenant indicators and 24 covenant indicators. This means that the hypothesis is
not supported: covenant is not the moderating variable between growth opportunity and debt
maturity. The level of covenant does not influence the reduction of negative impacts between
the growth opportunity and debt maturity.
The test result that use covenant as moderating variable between growth opportunity
and debt maturity is not statistically proven. This test shows that the presence of covenant does
not give the space for companies with high growth to make a loan in longer period. Other
implication from this testing also shows that the length of the issued debt maturity or bond
maturity, is not directly related with the detailed items within the trusteeship agreement. The
observation on debt maturity shows that the policy pattern of bond maturity in Indonesia is not
that diverse: ranging from 3 to 10 years. Most of the cases (54%) are due within 5 years.
Table 8.
Test Result of Hypothesis 2b
20 covenant indicators 24 covenant indicators
(Constant) 5.662 18.241** 5.662 18.241**
CAPXBVA -2.661   -2.033* -2.661  -2.033*
(Constant) -7.167  3.090** -6.641 -2.700**
Covindeks*CAPXBVA 1.753    0.473 1.752   0.405
Covenant indeks -1.117   -0.463 -2.563   0.936
Profitability -2.242   -0.822 -2.136  -0.789
Ln Size 0.519   3.299** 0.513  3.273**
Constraint 0.496    0.991 0.505   1.009
Coefficient Value t Coefficient Value t
Independent
Variable
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Covenants analyzed in this study are the Trusteeship Agreement, made by issuer and
Trustee. The items in the agreement are analyzed to see the indicators which can be used as the
basic of the arrangement of covenant index. The preliminary analysis resulted 24 agreement
items that served as the indicator of the covenant index arrangement. But not all these covenant
index works as moderating variable to reduce the negative relation between growth opportunity
and leverage, and between growth opportunity and debt maturity. The existing covenant index
then analyzed to obtain the most appropriate indicator. In the final analysis, we obtain 20
indicators in the trusteeship agreement to calculate the covenant index which serves significantly
as moderating variable. These indicators are as the following:
a. Covenant that limit the payments to equity holders and others, consist of: Dividend
payment restriction, share repurchase restrictive
b. Covenant which provides restrictions on financial activities, which consist of: funded
debt restrictive, Senior restrictive debt, total leverage tests, Sale and lease back
c. Covenant related to investment policy, consisting of: Invest policy restrictive, Mergers
restrictive,
d. Covenant related to business policy, consisting of Guarantee, Changes in the business,
Capital, Collateral, Affiliates, Loan, Restriction on loan or credit to associates, restricted
business activities - others than mentioned in AD, restriction to declaration of bankruptcy,
restriction to change shareholder structure, restriction to create a management agreements
with other parties which result in the shift of control of company business by other party,
restriction to the takeover of shares or assets of other parties.
Agency conflict is one phenomenon that emerged when a company implements a funding
policy which is mainly related with the policy leverage. The conflict here is caused by the conflicts
of interest between shareholders to debt holders. Many studies describe the efforts taken by
companies to control the agency conflict, one of which is the policy of low leverage and short
debt maturity in companies with high growth opportunity. On the other hand, companies with
low growth opportunity are to apply high leverage policy with a short maturity debt. In line
with the above research, this study also showed a similar thing. But in terms of operational, this
research focuses on changes in leverage. In terms of concept, both equally discuss about leverage.
Many other similar studies were conducted on companies with a high growth opportunity
that have a small size, low free cash flow and small assets in place. These companies are faced
with large investment opportunities but constrained by the limited funding. When a debt policy
is taken by the company to overcome the limitations of funding, it will be vulnerable against
the emergence of agency conflict between shareholders with debt holder. Finally, to control
the agency conflict, companies with high growth opportunity would take the policy of low
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leverage and short debt maturity, or even tend to use the internal resources to execute the
existing investment opportunities. This policy of course will result in a lack of funding during
the execution of an investment opportunity, which requires substantial funds. This will cause
companies with high growth opportunity to lose their investment opportunities and ultimately
will lose the opportunity to grow. In the opposite side, companies with low growth opportunity
are large-scale companies with a high free cash flow. The high free cash flow caused the
conflict between shareholders and managers, since shareholders assume that free cash flow
should be distributed as dividends, while managers assume that they have an interest to use it
in investment associated with the opportunity to grow. To resolve these conflicts, the companies
with low growth opportunity tend to use debt as a source of funding investment in new projects.
In other words the leverage policy within the companies with low growth opportunity is one
way to control the agency conflict that occurred in the company.
For the companies with high growth opportunity to be able to meet the maximum funding
requirements and in the long term to not miss the opportunity to grow, then the other policies
that can be taken by the companies to control the agency conflict is to include covenants in
their debt issuance. The results showed significant Trusteeship Agreement as the variables that
can control the agency conflict. There are 20 items in the trusteeship agreement that significantly
serve as variables that can reduce agency conflicts. Hence, in the preparation of the Trusteeship
Agreement, these 20 items can be listed.
V. CONCLUSION
From the test results of hypothesis, we can make the conclusions as follows:
1. There is a negative effect between growth opportunity and leverage change. Companies
with high growth rates tend to use lower leverage and use more their internal funds to
finance their growth. This policy is taken as one way to control the agency conflict between
shareholders and debt holder and to reduce the cost of debt that eventually will be at risk to
their capital structure.
2. The next test shows a negative effect between the growth opportunity and debt maturity.
This means that companies with high growth opportunity has a shorter maturity debt than
companies with low growth opportunity. Short-maturity debt policy is also one of the
alternative solutions for agency conflict between shareholders with bondholders.
3. Covenant proved significantly as a moderating variable that can reduce the negative effects
between growth opportunity and leverage. This means that the covenant made between
the issuer and the Trustee makes companies with high growth opportunity to make high
leverage policies to execute their opportunities to grow.
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Trusteeship Agreement that was made when the company issued their bonds, significantly
affects the company»s decision to issue a nominally large bond.
4. Covenant, which is predicted to reduce the negative effects from the influence of growth
opportunity on the debt maturity, is not proven significantly. The composed Trusteeship
Agreement does not allow companies with high growth opportunity to take the longer
maturity debt policy. The result of this study is different from the research of Billet et al.
(2007) which suggested an increase in the covenants protection on the increase of debt
maturity.
5. Covenant Index significantly serves as a moderating variable of 20 indicators. These indicators
are not absolute; the number can continue to grow depends on the aspects that can be
used as the basis of preparation. In this study, among 24 starter indicators, there were only
20 significant ones that significantly reduce the negative effect between the growth
opportunities with the leverage on the Trusteeship Agreement.
It should be underlined that this study has some limitations and can be further expanded
for future research development. The first limitation is that this study has constraint in determining
the number of samples. This limitation is due to the difficulty of accessing the data of Trusteeship
Agreements, since the data is not yet complete in the data center and the number of non-
financial companies that issue their bonds accompanied by the agreement are relatively much
less than the finance company. Second, the number of samples of this study is only 35 non-
financial companies during the period of 2003 - 2008. The subsequent research suggested
adding more sample of financial companies with a more varied proxy approach for a larger
amount of data. Third, the proxy employed in this research uses only financial statement data
without entering the market price. This is due to few samples which only issue bonds without
the issuance of stock share, so it is not possible to obtain its market value. Fourth, this study
ignores the functional and role aspects from the Institute of Trustee and the formal juridical
aspects. Future studies may include both these aspects within the variable that can reduce
agency conflicts in Indonesia.
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